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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






DWAYNE KAMAR SYBBLISS, 




ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A062-463-186) 
Immigration Judge: Mirlande Tadal 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 3, 2021 
Before:  GREENAWAY, JR., KRAUSE and BIBAS, Circuit Judges 
 







 Dwayne Kamar Sybbliss petitions for review of his final order of removal.  We 
will deny the petition. 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 





 Sybbliss is a citizen of Jamaica who entered the United States as a lawful 
permanent resident in 2012.  Sybbliss was later convicted twice in 2015 and once in 2018 
of possessing 50 grams or less of marijuana in violation of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:35-
10(a)(4).  On the basis of all three convictions, the Department of Homeland Security 
charged Sybbliss as removable for having been convicted of a controlled substance 
violation “other than a single offense involving possession for one’s own use of 30 grams 
or less of marijuana[.]”  8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).  (A.272.)  Sybbliss conceded his 
convictions but contested the charge.  He did not apply for any relief from removal.  An 
Immigration Judge (“IJ”) sustained the charge and ordered Sybbliss’s removal to 
Jamaica.  The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirmed by dismissing Sybbliss’s 
appeal on the merits.  Sybbliss petitions for review.1 
II. 
 Sybbliss raises essentially four arguments on review, but they lack merit.  First, 
Sybbliss argues that he is not removable pursuant to § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) because he 
qualifies for the so-called “personal use” exception under that statute.  As noted above, 
the statute renders noncitizens removable for controlled substance violations “other than 
a single offense involving possession for one’s own use of 30 grams or less of 
 
1 We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).  Sybbliss’s convictions limit our 
jurisdiction to constitutional claims and questions of law.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C), 
(D).  Sybbliss’s arguments qualify, and we review them de novo.  See Myrie v. Att’y 
Gen., 855 F.3d 509, 515 (3d Cir. 2017).  
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marijuana[.]”  8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).  Sybbliss argues that he qualifies for this 
exception because his three offenses collectively involved less than 30 grams.   
The BIA properly rejected that argument.  The statute excepts only a “single 
offense,” and Sybbliss does not qualify for the exception because he has been convicted 
of three offenses,2 not one.  See Rodriguez v. Holder, 619 F.3d 1077, 1079-80 (9th Cir. 
2010) (per curiam).  None of the authorities on which Sybbliss relies suggests otherwise,3 
and his arguments about Congressional intent and the wisdom of the law4 do not allow us 
to disregard the plain language of this statute.  Thus, we agree with the BIA that Sybbliss 
does not qualify for the personal-use exception.5 
 
2 In his brief, Sybbliss asserts that his 2018 conviction “was expunged by a State Judge.”  
Sybbliss has not provided any details or raised any argument in that regard, and he does 
not appear to have raised this issue before the BIA.  In any event, the analysis herein 
would be the same if Sybbliss had two operative convictions rather than three. 
 
3 Sybbliss relies, for example, on Esquivel v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 699 (5th Cir. 2015).  In 
that case, the court rejected the BIA’s conclusion that the personal-use exception did not 
apply to a conviction of possessing marijuana within 1,000 feet of a school.  See id. at 
702-06.  Esquivel did not involve multiple convictions and did not suggest that the 
personal-use exception applies despite multiple conviction.  To the contrary, the court 
recognized that the exception applies only when the conviction in question is the 
noncitizen’s first controlled substance offense.  See id. at 702.   
 
4 Sybbliss notes that New Jersey voters have approved a state constitutional amendment 
legalizing recreational marijuana.  He does not argue that this development invalidates 
his convictions or their immigration consequences, however, and it does not.  Cf. Khan v. 
Att’y Gen., 979 F.3d 193, 201-03 (3d Cir. 2020).   
 
5 For the same reason, we reject Sybbliss’s argument that he was eligible for a waiver 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h).  That provision, inter alia, allows the Attorney General to 
waive inadmissibility under § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) “insofar as it relates to a single offense 
of simple possession of 30 grams or less of marijuana[.]”  8 U.S.C. § 1182(h); see also 
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 Second, Sybbliss argues that his marijuana convictions are not otherwise 
removable offenses under § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).  He relies solely on a statement by a panel 
of this Court in Saunders v. Attorney General, 197 F. App’x 189 (3d Cir. 2006) (not 
precedential).  In that case, the panel concluded that the offense of selling marijuana in 
violation of New York Penal Law § 221.40 did not qualify for the personal-use exception 
because the offense required a sale rather than mere personal use.  See id. at *1.  In doing 
so, the panel stated that, while § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) “does not require that petitioner have 
engaged in ‘trafficking” in a controlled substance,” it requires “that he has engaged in 
something more than mere possession of less than 30 grams of marijuana.”  Id.   
Sybbliss argues that his offenses are not removable under the statute because, even 
considering his three convictions collectively, he did not engage in “something more than 
mere possession of less than 30 grams of marijuana.”  But this statement in Saunders, in 
addition to appearing in a nonprecedential opinion, merely distinguished between an 
offense involving a sale and an offense involving personal use.  It did not address the 
effect of multiple convictions.  Nor did it suggest that convictions of marijuana 
possession that do not qualify for the personal-use exception are not controlled substance 
violations, which they indisputably are.6 
 
Syblis v. Att’y Gen., 763 F.3d 348, 352 (3d Cir. 2014) (emphasizing that the waiver 
applies only to a “single offense”). 
 
6 Before the IJ, Sybbliss filed a motion to terminate his removal proceeding and argued 
that his convictions do not qualify as removable controlled substance violations for the 
different reason that New Jersey law classifies them as disorderly persons offenses.  He 
5 
 
Third, Sybbliss argues that the IJ denied him due process because she acted as an 
advocate for the Government by “bringing” or “expanding” the charges against him to 
include all three of his convictions.  Sybbliss claims that the IJ did so because the 
Government, in opposition to his motion to terminate, did not specifically argue that his 
three separate convictions prevented him from qualifying for the personal-use exception. 
 There is no basis for this argument.  Sybbliss’s motion to terminate was not based 
on the personal-use exception.  In any event, the Government expressly charged Sybbliss 
as removable on the basis of all three of his convictions and expressly charged that he 
was removable because he was convicted of a controlled substance violation “other than 
a single offense involving possession for one’s own use of 30 grams or less of 
marijuana[.]”  8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).  (A.272.)  The IJ did not “bring” a charge or 
“expand” the charges against him by sustaining that charge. 
 Finally, Sybbliss argues that the IJ erred in informing him that he is not eligible for 
cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a).  Sybbliss raised this argument before 
the BIA, and the BIA did not address it, but we need not remand for the BIA to do so 
because Sybbliss is ineligible for cancellation as a matter of law.  See Ricketts v. Att’y 
Gen., 955 F.3d 348, 351-52 (3d Cir. 2020); see also Yuan v. Att’y Gen., 642 F.3d 420, 
427 (3d Cir. 2011) (adopting harmless-error review in the immigration context). 
 
has not raised that issue on review.  Even if he had, the IJ applied the proper framework 
in rejecting that argument and we see no immediately apparent basis to question her 
conclusion.  See Castillo v. Att’y Gen., 729 F.3d 296, 307 (3d Cir. 2013). 
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Lawful permanent residents like Sybbliss are eligible for cancellation of removal 
if, inter alia, they have “resided in the United States continuously for 7 years after having 
been admitted in any status[.]”  8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(2).  The period of continuous 
residence is deemed to end either “(A) . . . when the alien is served with a notice to 
appear under section 1229(a) of this title, or (B) when the alien has committed an 
offense” that renders the alien inadmissible or removable, “whichever is earliest.”  8 
U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1)(A) & (B) (emphasis added). 
Sybbliss relies on the first of these provisions, as well as Pereira v. Session, 138 S. 
Ct. 2105 (2018), in arguing that he accrued seven years of continuous residence before 
the DHS served his notice to appear in October 2019.  But Sybbliss’s period of 
continuous residence ended under the second of these provisions before he accrued seven 
years.  Sybbliss arrived in the United States in 2012, and he committed all three offenses 
between 2015 and 2018, so his period of continuous residence ended under the second of 
these provisions before he accrued seven years.  See Barton v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1442, 
1449 (2020).  Pereira did not involve the second of these provisions and does not 
otherwise support any argument in this regard.  See Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2110 n.3 
(noting that § 1229b(d)(1)(B) “is not at issue here”). 
III. 
 For these reasons, we will deny Sybbliss’s petition for review.   The Government’s 
motion to dismiss his petition for lack of jurisdiction is denied. 
